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The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) aims at the assessment of people's willingness to 
pay (WTP) for a public project. The sum of the individual WTPs is interpreted as the social 
benefits of the project under consideration and compared to the project costs. If the benefits 
exceed the costs the project is recommended for realization. In very poor societies budgets 
are so tight that households cannot give up any part of their income, i.e. of their market 
consumption, in favour of a public project, so that their WTP for that project stated in a CVM 
interview has to be zero or close to zero. This leads to a severe discrimination against poor 
regions in the decision process on the allocation of public funds. Therefore, several authors 
suggest to use labour contributions to the realization of a public project instead of monetary 
contributions as a measure of people's WTP for that project. In this paper we show 
theoretically and empirically, based on a CVM study conducted in Vietnam, that labour is 
severely flawed as a measuring rod for individual utility so that CVM based on labour 
contributions does not provide a reliable and meaningful decision rule for the allocation of 
public projects.  
 
 
Keywords: Cost-benefit Analysis, Contingent Valuation, Developing Countries, Public 
Expenditures 
JEL-classification:  D6, H4, L3, Q25, Q51 
 
 
 
 
 
1)  Institute of Economics 520f, University of Hohenheim, Germany  
2)  Hanoi Agricultural University, Vietnam 
* corresponding author: Dr. Oliver Frör, Institute of Economics 520f, University of 
Hohenheim, 70593 Stuttgart, Germany, e-mail: froer@uni-hohenheim.de 
- 2 - 
1.  Introduction 
Cost-benefit analysis is an important tool for supporting decisions on the rational use of 
public funds, especially in the environmental sector. It aims at the assessment of the social 
benefits generated by some environmental project in order to compare these benefits to the 
costs of the project or to the social benefits generated by other projects. Thereby it helps to 
substantiate the decision if an environmental project should be realized or not, and it may 
also help to pick the best from a variety of alternative projects. Hence, in this application 
environmental valuation is primarily an instrument to enhance the efficiency of public 
spending. One of the most popular methods for the economic valuation of environmental 
projects is the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM). It is an interview-based direct valuation 
technique aiming at the assessment of people's maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for the 
realization of a public project (cf. Carson and Hanemann 2005).  
Interpreting a person's WTP for a commodity as a monetary measure for the utility she 
obtains from that commodity is in accordance with neoclassical household theory. From the 
first-order conditions for a utility maximum we know that in household equilibrium the price a 
consumer pays for a commodity equals the marginal utility (in monetary terms) she obtains 
from that commodity. The CVM transfers this market result to the idea of a hypothetical 
household demand for public goods like environmental quality where people's hypothetical 
WTP for a public good reflects the utility they obtain from that good. The WTP for a non-
infinitesimal quantity of a public good is interpreted as a consumer's Hicksian Compensating 
Variation (HCV) for the utility she obtains from that quantity. From the mathematical definition 
of the HCV (see section 2) it is obvious that it is a reliable (monetary) indicator of individual 
welfare in the sense that it is strictly monotonically increasing in the utility change it 
represents.  
In practice, however, the applicability of the CVM becomes problematic in countries where 
household incomes are very low and where subsistence economy prevails, so that a 
considerable part of a households' consumption is not bought in markets. WTP in terms of 
money is not a good utility measure in such cases since WTP is harshly restricted by 
households' ability to pay, i.e. by extremely tight budget constraints (cf. Ahlheim 1998). 
Therefore, the "classical" trade-off between private good consumption on the one hand and 
the consumption of a public good on the other, which forms the theoretical basis of the CVM, 
cannot be expressed adequately in terms of money or income under such circumstances. In 
the literature dealing with CVM in developing countries, therefore, sometimes other 
measuring units than money, especially labour contributions (see e. g. Hardner 1996, 
Echessah, Swallow and Kamara 1997, Hung et al. 2007) or staple food (cf. e. g. 
Shyamsundar and Kramer 1996, Asquith et al. 2008), are suggested for the valuation of 
public goods. Instead of asking people how much money they would be willing to give up to 
obtain a certain public good they are asked how many working days they would be willing to 
contribute to the provision of that good or how much rice they would be willing to sacrifice in 
order to enable the public good to be provided.   
In this paper we take a closer look at this form of in-kind measurement of benefits, especially 
the valuation of public goods and projects in terms of labour contributions. In the next section 
we discuss the theoretical background of the labour approach to contingent valuation of 
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public goods. In section 3 we describe our empirical survey approach in northern Vietnam 
and lay out our hypotheses regarding the suitability of labour as a measuring unit for the 
benefits accruing from a public project. Our main hypothesis is that labour cannot properly 
substitute money as a measuring unit for project benefits since it is not a universal means of 
payment like money which can be converted into any kind of consumption. We hypothesize 
that the WTP for a public project in terms of labour contributions depends on the specific kind 
of work and the circumstances under which it has to be done. In section 4 we test this 
hypothesis in a CVM study in which we assess Vietnamese people's WTP for a landslide 
protection program in mountainous regions of northern Vietnam. After having asked 
respondents of our CVM interviews their WTP for this project in monetary terms we asked 
them if they would also be willing to "pay" for this project in terms of working hours in addition 
to money. Over 80% of our respondents answered "yes" to this question. In a split sample 
we suggested two different kinds of work (one split was offered "hard work", the other "soft 
work" as a means of payment) where respondents in the "hard work" split were also told that 
they had to be available at any time for the work, while the "soft work" respondents where 
told that they could choose at their own convenience when they would like to do this work. As 
we had expected WTP in terms of "hard work" was significantly lower than WTP in terms of 
"soft work" which shows that WTP in terms of labour depends on the specific kind of work 
and the circumstances under which it has to be done. This result suggests that labour 
contributions cannot be used as a universal measuring rod for the valuation of public 
projects, since WTP in terms of labour done by different persons under different 
circumstances cannot be aggregated to assess the social value of a public project. Section 5 
contains some concluding remarks.  
 
2.  Theoretical considerations 
The economic valuation of changes in environmental quality caused by a public project 
typically aims at the question whether or not society as a whole is better off after that project 
has been performed. Two steps are necessary to answer this question: first, individual 
welfare changes of all people potentially affected by the project in question have to be 
assessed and, second, these individual welfare changes have to be aggregated in order to 
compute the resulting change in social welfare.  
The change of individual welfare or utility accruing from an improvement of environmental 
quality to an individual j can be expressed by the direct utility function according to  
 (1) Δ Uj   =   U1j  -  U 0j  = uj (xj1, z1)  -  uj (xj0, z0)  
where the index j denotes individuals j ∈{1, 2, ..., J} and U 0j  and U1j  denote the utility levels 
attained by individual j before (situation 0) and after (situation 1) the project. The utility 
function uj(⋅) is strictly monotonically increasing in market consumption xj∈ℜN and in 
environmental quality as expressed by a vector of parameters describing the state of the 
environment z∈ℜM.  
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Since utility changes cannot be observed directly ΔUj is typically measured by the Hicksian 
Compensating Variation (HCV). If we concentrate solely on the environmental quality effects 
of a public project the Hicksian Compensating Variation for an individual j can be described 
by  
(2) HCVj (p, z
1, Uj
0, Uj
1)   =   ej (p, z
1, Uj
1)  -  ej (p, z
1, Uj
0)  
where ej (⋅) is the jth individual's expenditure function. This kind of welfare measurement is 
illustrated in fig. 1 where x is a composite of all market commodities and z represents 
environmental quality. Since the price of the composite commodity is normalized to one 
income I equals maximum market consumption X. If environmental quality increases as a 
consequence of a public project from z0 to z1 utility changes from U0 to U1. The maximum 
amount of money individual j can give up in the new situation 1 without being worse off than 
in the initial situation 0 is represented by the vertical distance between the new and the initial 
indifference curve at the new equilibrium, i.e. by the distance BC in fig. 1. This distance 
represents individual j's HCV and can be interpreted as her WTP for the public project that 
causes utility to rise from U0 to U1.  
 
 
z
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HCV=WTP
C U1
 
 
-  Fig. 1: The Compensating Variation  - 
 
For the political decision if an environmental project should be carried out or not it is 
necessary to aggregate individual utility changes as expressed by the HCV according to (2). 
As a convention the Hicks-Kaldor criterion, according to which a public project should be 
accepted as socially beneficial if  
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is positive, is widely accepted in cost-benefit analysis. In the practice of CVM studies a 
representative household sample is chosen and the average WTP of the households of this 
sample is multiplied by the number of all households affected by the project in question in 
order to obtain the social benefits it creates as  
(4) socialB  =  sampleWTPJ ⋅    . 
If the chosen household sample is representative, the difference between social benefits and 
costs, i. e. ( socialB  -  socialC ),  is a good proxy for ∑
=
J
1j
jHCV so that the decision criterion 
(5) socialB  - socialC  =  
                 = sampleWTPJ ⋅   -  socialC      
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
→<
→=
→>
realizedbenotshouldprojectthe0
notorrealizedbecanprojectthe0
realizedbeshouldprojectthe0
   
corresponds to the Hicks-Kaldor Criterion. The Hicks-Kaldor Criterion as well as the derived 
decision criterion (5) are based on the condition that utility is measured in monetary terms 
here, i.e. in terms of the HCV according to (2). Money as a measuring rod for utility has 
several advantages. The money-based individual welfare measure (2) is strictly 
monotonically increasing in utility which makes it a reliable welfare measure from a 
theoretical point of view. In most societies money is part of people's everyday life so that 
respondents have a clear-cut idea of what money means to them, which commodities can be 
bought for a certain amount of money and how much utility can be expected from these 
commodities. So, also in people's minds there is a close relationship between money and 
utility. This is important if people have to describe utility changes in monetary terms as it is 
the case when they are asked their WTP for a certain public good in a CVM interview: the 
question behind the WTP question is how much utility in terms of market consumption they 
are willing to give up in order to obtain the utility they expect from the public good. A 
necessary condition for a reliable answer to this question is that people are able to "translate" 
these utility changes correctly into the medium in which their WTP has to be expressed. With 
money as a medium this translation process seems to be rather straightforward.  
The compensation scheme underlying the Hicks-Kaldor Criterion is based on the view that "a 
dollar is dollar is a dollar", i.e. that money is always the same, no matter who owns it, and 
that it is always allocated optimally according to the optimality rule that the marginal cost-
benefit ratio (∂ u / ∂ xn) / pn (= marginal utility of income) has to be the same for all different 
uses. Therefore, money is a perfect aggregator for the variety of different goods we consume 
and which create utility for us. All these different goods can be aggregated into one single 
medium, money, which, on the other hand, can be converted back into utility-creating goods 
(and, therefore, into utility) at any time because of its universal character.  
When considering other numeraires than money for CVM studies one should note that (5) is 
meaningful as a welfare-based social decision criterion only if the numeraire in terms of 
which individual WTP is measured  
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(C1) is strictly monotonically increasing in individual utility,  
(C2) is part of people's everyday life so that they are familiar with it in the sense 
that they know what it means to them in terms of utility,  
(C3) can be aggregated over individuals in a welfare theoretically meaningful way. 
As soon as other aggregators than money are used one has to make sure that the criteria 
(C1) to (C3) are met. Criterion (C1) aims at the theoretical link between the numeraire on the 
one hand and individual utility on the other. It makes sure that the numeraire has any welfare 
theoretical significance at all. (C2) aims at the psychological link between the numeraire and 
utility in the minds of people. Only if people are closely familiar with the numeraire from their 
everyday lives they know what it means to them in terms of utility. The (hypothetical) 
compensation mechanism inherent in the Hicks-Kaldor Criterion makes it necessary that 
utility changes measured in terms of the numeraire can be compared and aggregated over 
individuals.  
If only the benefits accruing from a public project are assessed in a CVM study while the 
costs are expressed in terms of money (as is usually the case) it is also necessary that the 
numeraire 
(C4) can be converted into monetary terms so that the social benefits 
sampleWTPJ ⋅  can be compared to the social costs socialC  of a public 
project according to (5).  
This discussion shows that it will be difficult to find a numeraire other than money which fulfils 
these criteria. Therefore, money seems to be first choice as a numeraire in CVM studies but 
there are circumstances under which the use of money is problematic.  
The downside of using a money metric for the measurement of utility is that in very poor 
societies households often do not have enough money to express their appreciation of a 
public good in monetary terms. If a household lives on the poverty line there is simply not 
enough money left to be spent on public projects.  
This is illustrated in fig. 2 where the household's income is just sufficient to cover the 
minimum level of consumption needed to survive.1 At this basic level of consumption nearly 
no substitution of the public good for private consumption is possible, i. e. the household's 
WTP to increase environmental quality from z0 to z1 must be close to zero. At the new 
equilibrium in point B in fig. 2 nearly no additional quantity of the public good could 
compensate the household for a further loss in income. While in theory there must be a 
positive vertical distance between the two indifference curves so that the HCV is positive, but 
infinitesimally small, in practical CVM interviews the WTP respondents state in such cases is 
                                                          
 
1 One can think of such a situation in terms of a Stone-Geary utility function according to 
( ) ( ) α−α ⋅γ−= 1zxz,xu  where γ is the subsistence level of market consumption.  
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zero. This result has shown in many practical CVM studies in developing countries (cf. e.g. 
Whittington 1998 and 2002).  
 
z
x
xI = A
U0
z0
B
z1
U1
CHCV = WTP
 
 
-  Fig. 2: Living on the poverty line  - 
 
Nevertheless, also at this low level of private consumption the household experiences an 
increase in utility from U0 to U1 as a consequence of the improvement of environmental 
quality. In this case the WTP of zero stated by the household in a CVM interview would not 
reflect the change in its well-being adequately. If the utility change resulting from the increase 
in environmental quality were measured by the Hicksian Equivalent Variation  
(6) HEVj (p, z
0, Uj
0, Uj
1)   =   ej (p, z
0, Uj
1)  -  ej (p, z
0, Uj
0)  
instead of the HCV things would look different. The HEV measures the utility change in terms 
of the income change that would lead the household to the new utility level U1 without any 
change in environmental quality. In fig. 3 it can be seen that the HEV for the environmental 
improvement from z0 to z1 is clearly positive and can be represented by the distance AD.  
As a consequence one might tend to use the Equivalent Variation instead of the 
Compensating Variation as a welfare measure in CVM studies like e. g. in Shyamsundar and 
Kramer (1996). This does not seem to be a promising way to solve the problem of low 
budgets since the HEV is generally considered an inadequate welfare measure in stated-
preference surveys since it leads to exaggerative results (cf. e. g. Ahlheim and Buchholz 
2000). Asking a household's HEV for an increase in environmental quality amounts to asking 
its willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for NOT getting this environmental 
improvement. While HEV and HCV are equivalent from a theoretical point of view they are 
not equivalent from a psychological point of view. When asked their WTP for an 
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environmental improvement people tend to state much lower amounts of money than the 
amount they claim as a compensation (WTA) for not getting this improvement.  
Psychological reasons for this disparity between WTP and WTA are suggested by, among 
others, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Knetsch (1994 and 1995), Boyce et al. (1992), 
Shogren et al. (1994), Morrison (1997) and Shogren and Hayes (1997). The general idea 
underlying these papers is that people have a strong psychological affinity to the status quo 
such that they are rather unwilling to accept a change for the worse and, therefore, demand 
high compensation payments for any deterioration of their actual situation while, in the WTP-
situation, they are willing to pay only a comparatively modest sum for an equivalent 
improvement.  
 
z
x
xI =
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U0
z0
B
z1
U1
D
HEV = WTA
 
 
-  Fig. 3: The Equivalent Variation  - 
 
From these considerations it follows that using the HEV or WTA as a welfare measure in 
CVM studies in developing countries is not a feasible option to overcome the problem of tight 
budget constraints in such countries. Other solutions have to be found. In a series of articles 
Whittington (1992, 1998, 2002) analyzed the specific problems faced by CVM researchers in 
developing countries. Since then the number of publications regarding the problems of 
conducting CVM surveys in Asia, Africa and South America has increased considerably. One 
of the central aspects in these studies is the tight budget constraint of respondents living on 
the subsistence level and their inability to express their true appreciation of a public project in 
terms of WTP.  
Another approach to deal with the problem of tight money budgets is to use in-kind payments 
to value public goods or projects. In a CVM study Shyamsundar and Kramer (1996) 
assessed people's WTA for a restricted access to the Mantadia National Park in eastern 
Madagascar in terms of baskets of rice. In this study rice was treated as a numeraire and 
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afterwards converted into money by multiplying the number of rice baskets people claimed 
as their WTA by the market price of rice in terms of U.S. Dollars. At first sight choosing rice 
as a numeraire in this context seems to be a reasonable choice since rice fulfils the criteria 
(C1) to (C4) explained above. But when you look at it again it becomes obvious that this 
measurement method is practicable for a WTA study but does not work in a WTP context if 
people are really living on the poverty line (which was our problem here), because then they 
could give up neither money nor rice in order to protect rain forests from exploitation. A WTA 
survey does not lead to reliable results as was explained above and a WTP analysis is not 
feasible even with rice in a starving society, therefore, using rice as a numeraire does not 
solve the problem of tight budgets. Additionally, since rice can easily be converted into 
money the question arises why one should ask WTP in terms of rice first and then convert it 
into money later. In another study Asquith et al. (2008) use beehives and apicultural training 
as a "currency" to compensate farmers in Bolivia's Los Negros valley (Department of Santa 
Cruz) for the protection of threatened cloud forest habitat. For participants of this program 
tree cutting, hunting and forest clearing are prohibited on certain enrolled lands. As a 
"Payment for Environmental Services" (PES) they obtain beehives and learn how to cultivate 
them and harvest honey. In order to calculate the monetary value of these PES the price of 
the beehives and the value of the increase in human capital expressed in terms of future 
profits from apiculture are assessed. The PES can be interpreted as a kind of WTA 
compensation for not being allowed to exploit the cloud forest. Again, this does not seem to 
solve the problem of tight budget constraints since beehives and apicultural training could 
hardly be used as a numeraire for a WTP analysis and regarding a WTA analysis the same 
objections that were explained before hold here, too. Further, there are severe doubts that 
people can really calculate the present value of future profits from beekeeping so that at least 
criteria (C2) and (C4) are violated here.  
Since WTA seems to be unsuitable as a welfare measure in CVM studies and since WTP in 
terms of money or in-kind does not seem to lead to useful results in societies where many 
households live on the poverty line, several studies try to solve the budget problem by using 
labour contributions as a numeraire for poor households' WTP for public projects. In these 
studies households are not asked how much money they are willing to pay for a public good 
but, instead, they are asked how many working days they are willing to contribute to the 
provision of this good (cf. e. g. Hardner 1996, Echessah, Swallow and Kamara 1997, Hung et 
al. 2007). While some of these studies rely on the valuation in terms of labour only, others 
give respondents the possibility to state their contributions in terms of labour and / or money 
(cf. Stone 2008, Saxena 2008). Echessah et al. (1997) asked respondents in a CVM survey 
whether they are willing to contribute work or money or both in a tsetse control program in 
Kenya. For those who agreed, that question was followed by an open-ended question 
regarding the monthly amount they were willing to contribute during one year. It turned out 
that 57% were willing to contribute money and labour, while 28% wanted to contribute labour 
only and 10% only money. In a CVM survey in rural Vietnam, Hung et al. (2007) asked 
households their willingness to contribute labour to a forest fire prevention program. In their 
study two types of payment card were applied; an ordinary payment card indicating different 
money amounts and another one, offering options on how many working days they would be 
willing to contribute to the provision of such a project. In their study only 25% of all 
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respondents (among farmers it was only 10%) stated a positive willingness to pay in terms of 
money, while 90% stated their WTP in terms of labour.  
At first sight labour seems to be a plausible choice of a numeraire in poor societies. Even if 
people live on the poverty line there is typically some time left for participating in public 
works, i.e.  their time budget is by far not as tight as their money budget. Further, criterion 
(C2) is satisfied since people in poor societies typically are acquainted to physical labour, i.e. 
they know what physical work means for their wellbeing or (dis-)utility. Also criterion (C1), i.e. 
strict monotonicity in utility, seems to be satisfied for most households though the possibility 
that some people might even enjoy participating in public works because they meet friends 
there or because it gives them the feeling of doing something "good" or important cannot be 
ruled out completely. In these cases WTP stated in terms of working days does not measure 
a net sacrifice people are willing to make in order to get the public good in question, but it 
contains also significant parts of positive utility in addition to the utility created by the public 
good.  
Even more problematic is the question to what extent the criteria (C3) and (C4), i. e. the 
conversion of labour contributions into money, can be met if labour is employed as a 
numeraire. In practical CVM studies the problem of converting labour into money according 
to (C4) is often "solved" by simply multiplying the working hours offered by CVM respondents 
by some average wage rate (see e. g. Hung et al. 2007, Sexana 2008 or Stone et al. 2008). 
Obviously, this makes sense only if respondents really had the possibility to earn this wage 
during the time they offer as WTP for the public good, so that the average wage represents 
the opportunity costs of their work contribution to the public good. Typically this will not be 
the case, especially if they are self-employed small-scale farmers like in our study presented 
in the next section. Therefore, the average wage is meaningless for them and, therefore, also 
for the CVM study. The valuation of time is more sophisticated, especially, since time can be 
used for various different purposes which have different relations to utility. This is shown e.g. 
by Dalenberg et al. (2004) in a contingent valuation study where they show that time can 
have different values to a person depending on which activity is undertaken. A first 
theoretical model on how to value time in which different dimensions of time are considered 
was constructed by Becker (1965). He stated that “the cost of time […] varies considerably 
among commodities and at different periods." (p. 503). Later on De Serpa (1971) and Evans 
(1972) extended Becker’s ideas. In more recent years further approaches were developed to 
measure the value of time e.g. by Propper (1990), Jacoby (1993) and Dalenberg et al. 
(2004). A broad field of literature evolved regarding the valuation of time in the context of 
recreation demand estimation based on Cesario (1976) (see e.g. Bockstael 1987, Alvarez-
Farizo et al. 2001, Lew and Larson 2005, Amoako-Tuffour et al. 2008, Hynes 2008, Jara-
Diaz 2008, Palmquist 2009), in the transportation literature, where travel time savings are 
evaluated (e.g. Jiang 2004) and in the literature on the valuation of time spent on housework 
(e.g. Cheswick 1982). In a CVM study in Korea Eom and Larson (2006) asked respondents 
to state their WTP to pay for an improvement of water quality in the Man Kyoung River in 
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Korea in terms of money and, alternatively, in terms of time spent on housework.2 In their 
study they find that the marginal value of housework time is about 70-80% of the average 
wage in the region.  
This discussion shows that measuring the utility gains expected from a public project in terms 
of labour contributions is more than problematic. One part of the problem is that typically at 
the moment when the CVM interview is conducted respondents do not know yet how they 
would spend the time to be used on the public work alternatively, i.e. without the public work. 
Would they work in another job and earn money? Would they work in their fields? Would they 
do housework? Or would they spend it on leisure and recreation? All of these activities have 
different "opportunity costs" in terms of utility so that it is not clear in advance how big a 
sacrifice in utility terms people are willing to make in favour of the public good, if they state a 
"willingness to work" (WTW) of, say, five working days. The opportunity costs of the labour 
contribution will also depend on the question when the work has to be done. Will it be when 
farmers have to do a lot of work in their fields or will it be off-season? Will they have the 
opportunity to choose freely when they want to work for the public good, or will they have to 
be available whenever it is considered necessary by the organizers of the work? Further, the 
disutility accruing from the work itself will depend on the conditions and circumstances under 
which it has to be done and also on the kind of work respondents are used to from their 
everyday lives. Physical work will cause a higher disutility to a civil servant or a government 
official than to a farmer. For all these reasons it seems that conditions (C3) and (C4) cannot 
be satisfied by labour as a numeraire in CVM studies, but also the fulfilment of (C1) is 
questionable since the (dis-)utility equivalent of labour contributions, i.e. the sacrifice people 
are willing to make for the public project, depends on the specific circumstances of the work 
to be done and on the specific living conditions of the different respondents. For some 
respondents communal work might even be fun and not a sacrifice at all. In addition to these 
problems WTW answers may be biased by the existence of social norms with respect to 
communal norms in many societies. In Vietnam, where we conducted our CVM survey, 
participation in communal work is a "matter of honour" so that people are under social 
pressure to participate in such works, no matter what purpose these works serve.  
Under such circumstances one has to be rather cautious with the interpretation of WTW 
answers. In our study on landslide protection in Vietnam which is presented in the next 
section we try to highlight empirically the questions addressed in this section.  
 
3. The survey 
The research site for our survey in Northern Vietnam is Yen Chau district in Son La province 
located about 250 kilometres west of Hanoi. The National Road No. 6 from Hanoi to Son La 
continuing to Dien Bien Phu which leads through Yen Chau is especially endangered by 
                                                          
 
2  Respondents were told that they could improve water quality by „changing their food preparation 
and disposal practices and water use in the bathroom, kitchen and laundry.“ 
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landslides during the rainy season. Landslides occur both in steeply sloped agricultural areas 
where sometimes entire farming fields are washed downhill, and in direct vicinity of roads 
without sufficient roadside stabilization. Especially during the typhoon season with intensive 
rainfalls from July to November poorly stabilized slopes move downhill burying fields, fish 
ponds, houses and, very often, roads. Consequently, people in landslide-prone areas suffer 
in many ways from these recurrent landslides: substantial numbers of people lose their 
homes, road blockings and destruction severely impair the transportation of people and 
merchandise for various days or weeks. Some people even loose their lives due to 
landslides.  
The preparation of the survey was done in a sequence of steps as recommended in the 
literature (cf. e.g. Carson and Hanemann 2005). Before the survey, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with 50 representatives of the different social and economic groups in Yen Chau 
district in order to get a first impression of people's experiences with and their attitudes 
towards landslides. The respondents in these interviews comprised members of the People's 
Committee, Communist Party officials, members of the district administration, village heads, 
merchants, truck drivers, farmers, farm workers etc. On the basis of the results from these 
interviews a first questionnaire was developed. This questionnaire was tested and 
continuously further developed in two waves of pretests with a total of 65 completed face-to-
face interviews. In addition, two rounds of Citizen Expert Group meetings (cf. Ahlheim et al. 
2010, in press) were conducted with representatives of the survey population. During these 
meetings the whole questionnaire, especially the description of the project scenario and 
payment mechanism, was discussed and modifications of the text to lead to a better 
understanding by respondents were made. The main survey with 500 randomly selected 
households of villages located along National Road No. 6 in Yen Chau district was 
conducted in April 2008. 
The questionnaire used in the survey consisted of three main groups of questions. The first 
referred to the respondents' personal experiences with landslides in order to explore their 
awareness of the problem in general and the damages they suffered due to landslides in 
particular. We also investigated their opinion on the main causes for the occurrence of 
landslides in this region. In the second part of the questionnaire we suggested a landslide 
protection program (project scenario) which consisted of several protection measures that 
had been proposed by our interview partners in the pretests and in the in-depth interviews. 
Based on suggestions obtained from the in-depth interviews and pretests in the third part of 
our questionnaire we constructed the following scenario for a landslide protection program 
which afterwards had to be valued by the respondents of our main survey:  
"As a consequence of the landslides in recent years, government authorities as well as 
scientists were looking for possibilities to reduce the risk of landslides in the region of Yen 
Chau. They would like to propose a landslide protection program that could comprise 
amongst other activities reforestation, appropriate changes of agricultural practices, 
stabilization of slopes, measures against soil erosion, roadside stabilization, etc. Those 
activities would be coordinated by government authorities. This program would lead to a 
prevention of future landslides in the region of Yen Chau and contribute to a more 
sustainable land use for a better environment." 
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In the questionnaire, this text was accompanied by graphical illustrations of the proposed 
measures. Then we asked our respondents how much money they would be willing to 
contribute if this program were to be realized. For the construction of the respective payment 
scenario the results from our pretests, in-depth interviews and CEG meetings again turned 
out to be very helpful. When we asked who should pay for the landslide protection measures 
most respondents suggested then that the main part should be financed out of public funds 
while the rest should come from citizen action groups with mandatory work contributions and 
from financial contributions by local people. Having the choice between financing the part of 
the cost which had to be borne by the local people by compulsory payments like new taxes 
or by voluntary contributions most respondents suggested the compulsory version. From 
these suggestions gathered from our pretests we constructed a payment scenario where 
households in Yen Chau would make a compulsory contribution into a landslide protection 
fund. Respondents were told that the described project would be realized only if the overall 
money people are willing to contribute to that fund covers that part of the cost that cannot be 
borne by government alone. Following the description of the payment scenario, respondents 
were asked to mark on a payment card the highest amount of money that would be 
acceptable for the household to contribute twice a year for a duration of three years. For the 
elicitation of WTP the payment card format was chosen due to the encouraging experience 
that had been made with this format in Southeast Asia and also in other socio-economic 
contexts (cf. Ahlheim et al. 2008, Champ and Bishop 2006, Cameron and Huppert 1989). Its 
range was determined during the pre-tests and CEG meetings.  
After having asked people their WTP for landslide protection in terms of money we asked 
them: "In addition to this payment would you be wiling to contribute working time to the 
realization of this project?". Almost 85 % of the respondents agreed to that question. This was 
a prerequisite for our intention to test the suitability of labour as a numeraire for measuring 
WTP for a public project. Based on the theoretical consideration of the previous section our 
hypotheses were that the willingness to contribute labour to the provision of a public project 
(willingness to work – WTW) depends significantly on 
(H1) the kind of labour and the circumstances under which it has to be done, 
(H2) the kind of work people do in their everyday lives,  
(H3) the opportunity cost of the time they would have to spend on the communal 
work. 
If these hypotheses proved to be true this would mean that – differently from WTP in 
monetary terms - the knowledge of people's stated WTW would say nothing about the 
sacrifice in terms of utility they are willing to make in order to secure the provision of the 
public good "landslide protection" (i. e. criterion (C1) for a feasible numeraire would be 
violated). In this case labour would not be a "currency" uniquely defined in terms of utility like 
money. Its equivalent in terms of utility would depend on the specific kind of work necessary 
for a specific project (H1), while for money it holds that "a dollar is a dollar is a dollar". 
Therefore, the social benefits in terms of labour, i. e. sampleWTWJ ⋅ , could not be 
compared between different projects in order to find out which is most beneficial from a 
social point of view. Further, labour contributions would not be comparable between different 
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people since their "value" in terms of utility would depend on individual people's everyday 
occupation (H2) and on the kind of time they would have to sacrifice for the communal work 
(H3). Anyway, it seems that for people who are not used to physical work in their everyday 
life (government officials, clerks, shop owners etc.) it would be difficult to imagine what the 
specific kind of work required for a certain project would mean for their wellbeing or utility 
since they have no experience with it, so that also criterion (C2) would be violated. If WTW 
depends on the opportunity cost of the time spent on the communal work according to (H1) it 
would also be impossible to convert WTW into monetary terms (C4) since at the moment of 
the CVM interview respondents cannot know with certainty which use of their time (the 
specific kind of work or leisure) they would make if the communal work would not have to be 
done. Therefore, the payment vehicle which is decisive for the elicitation question is uniquely 
determined, if it plays a role for stated WTW according to (H3) this numeraire cannot be used 
for measuring individual welfare or utility.  
In order to test (H1) to (H3) we designed two different payment scenarios in terms of labour 
contributions, one "hard work" scenario and one "soft work" scenario, which were presented 
to two different split samples of 250 households each:  
 
"Soft work" scenario (Split 1): 
"If you were employed as part of a working group planting trees on hilltop areas in 
Yen Chau district and if the organization of the works would allow you to choose the 
days of your personal working contribution at your convenience, how many working 
days would you be willing to contribute?" 
and 
"Hard work" scenario (Split 2): 
" If you were employed as part of a working group constructing protection walls along 
the roads in Yen Chau district and if the organization of the works would require that 
you have to be available whenever necessary (which might happen also during 
seeding and harvesting time), how many working days would you be willing to 
contribute? " 
 
In the following section the results of the CVM survey on the value of landslide protection in 
Yen Chau district will be presented and the hypotheses H1 – H3 stated above will be tested. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
Characteristics of the survey population 
The means of the most important socio-economic variables in our sample are presented in 
table 1. Among the 500 interviews only 171 (34.2%) have been conducted with women, 
which is due to the fact that the interviews have been conducted with the household head 
who is also responsible for other economic decisions of the household. The average age was 
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almost 46 years and the average household consisted of 4 persons with 2 children. Over 
90% of the people interviewed stated that they are married. 
Table 1: Socio-economic characteristics of the survey population 
Variable Mean S.D. 
Gender (0=male, 1=female) 0.34 - 
Age 45.59 13.535 
Household size 4.39 1.472 
Income (in mio VND/year) 27.91 18.91 
Since Yen Chau is a rather rural area it is not surprising that 65% of the interviewed 
households are farmers (another 15% are self-employed and most of the rest (12.2%) are 
officials) with a rather low level of education (less than 25% having finished high school or 
higher educational degrees). Since the farmers live at least partly on a subsistence level the 
total average yearly income is rather low reaching an average of 28 million VND (about 
1400€). Concerning the ethnicities most of our interviews have been conducted with Black 
Thai people (68.4%) which constitute the majority in that area. Although in the rest of 
Vietnam most people belong to the ’Kinh’ in Yen Chau district they constitute a minority. In 
our survey 30.8% of the interviews have been conducted with Kinh, only 4 surveys were 
conducted with households from other ethnic groups, like Muong and Kho Mu. 
 
WTP and its determinants 
For the estimation of WTP a logarithmic functional form of the WTP function was used 
following Cameron and Huppert (1989) and Haab and McConnell (2002). This functional 
form has desirable properties both from a theoretical and a statistical perspective. Contrary 
to the linear functional form often used, it is ensured that WTP cannot be negative which is 
plausible in the case of a utility increasing project and it allows to estimate mean and median 
WTP separately. Since it is found in this study that the distribution of payment card intervals 
chosen by the respondent households is skewed to the left, it should be expected that 
median WTP is smaller than mean WTP. In this model, the logarithm of household h's WTP 
for the program is assumed to be a linear combination of characteristics of the household 
denoted as a vector xh and an unobservable error term εh, i. e. log WTPh = x'β + εh where β is 
a vector of parameters to be estimated. Under the assumption of normally distributed error 
terms a probit model of the payment card responses (bids) can be specified following 
Cameron and Huppert (1989). From this model, a mean WTP for the proposed program of 
22,931 VND (the 95% confidence interval estimated by the bootstrap approach by Park et 
al., 1991 ranges from 20,972 to 25,106 VND) and a median of 14,263 [13,064 to 15,579] 
VND are estimated.  
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Table 2: Description of variables used in the regression models 
Variable Description Mean S.D. 
PROBLEM Indicates whether respondent considers landslides 
as a problem that needs to be redressed by extra 
efforts (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
0.78 - 
SHORTAGE No. of times shortages of commodities were 
experienced due to landslides in the last 5 years 
≤ 5 - 
DAMAGE_FARM No. of times damages to the farm were 
experienced due to landslides in the last 5 years 
6 – 10 - 
DAMAGE_MERC No. of times damages to merchandise were 
experienced due to landslides in the last 5 years 
≤ 5 - 
ECONLOSS No. of times economic losses were experienced 
due to landslides in the last 5 years 
6 – 10 - 
SEVERE Respondent rating of severeness of the damages 
suffered in 2007 (1 = not at all, 4 = very severe)  
2.75 0.879 
REPAIR_MONEY Amount of money expended to repair personal 
damages due to landslides in 2007  
1 – 10 
Mio. VND 
- 
REPAIR_WORK Amount of working time expended to repair 
personal damages due to landslides in 2007  
2 - 7 - 
WORRY Rating of being worried about landslides in the 
future (1 = not at all, 4 = very worried) 
3.30 0.775 
IMPROVEROAD Rating of importance of preventing road blockings 
in the future(1 = not important at all, 5 = very 
important) 
3.65 0.564 
IMPROVEEROS Rating of importance of reducing soil erosion in 
the future(1 = not important at all, 5 = very 
important) 
3.71 0.497 
APPROVAL Rating of overall approval of the program (scale 
from 1 to 10) 
9.30 0.939 
SAD Rating of feeling sad when forests are destroyed 
(1 = not at all, 5 = very much) 
4.38 1.160 
HAPPY Rating of approval of the statement that nature is 
important for contributing to human happiness 
(1 = not at all, 5 = very much) 
4.87 0.407 
INCOMESAT Rating of satisfaction with the household's income 
(1 = compl. unsatisfied, 5 = compl. satisfied) 
2.56 1.169 
COMPARE Judgment of own economic situation as compared 
to others (1 = much worse, 4 = much better) 
2.50 0.599 
EDU Level of education (scale from 1 to 7) 2.87 1.350 
ETHNIC Ethnicity of respondents (1 = kinh, 0 = ethnic 
minorities) 
0.3 - 
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In a next step, a regression model with explanatory variables expected to systematically 
influence stated WTP was estimated. Table 2 gives an explanation and some descriptive 
statistics of these variables. From the probit regression results in table 3 it can be seen that 
many variables show a significant effect on WTP in our study, most of the estimated 
influences are plausible from a theoretical point of view. The more severely hit respondents 
were by landslides in 2007 and the more money they had expended to repair the damages 
the higher was their WTP. The more they appreciate a lower frequency of road blockings due 
to landslides the higher is their WTP. The judgment of feeling better off than other 
households in the area and the level of education also had a strongly significant positive 
effect on WTP. Regarding environmental attitudes, respondents who consider nature to be 
important for contributing to human happiness have a higher WTP, which is plausible, while 
the significantly negative relationship between feeling sad when forests are cut and WTP is 
rather puzzling, as we think. 
Table 3: Determinants of willingness to pay 
Variable Coefficient Significance (p-value)
CONSTANT -6.95*** 0.0000 
lnBID -1.19*** 0.0000 
PROBLEM 110.99 0.4245 
SEVERE 179.98** 0.0121 
REPAIR_MONEY 138.57*** 0.0018 
REPAIR_WORK -42.44 0.3344 
WORRY 42.70 0.6598 
IMPROVEROAD 202.18* 0.0810 
IMPROVEEROS -51.54 0.6937 
APPROVAL 107.30 0.1191 
SAD -157.97*** 0.0007 
HAPPY 345.68*** 0.0025 
INCOMESAT 77.71 0.1160 
COMPARE 261.38*** 0.0074 
EDU 108.33*** 0.0065 
Log-Likelihood -816.2005 - 
χ2-statistics 1632 (df = 15) 0.0000 
***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 %, respectively 
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Willingness to work for landslide protection 
As mentioned above, in our study we asked respondents after the WTP statement whether in 
addition to their monetary contribution they would be willing to contribute some of their time 
to work on the implementation of the landslide protection measures. Almost 85 % of the 
respondents agreed to that question. To test our hypothesis H1 that the willingness to 
contribute labour to the implementation of a public project depends on the kind of labour and 
the circumstances under which it has to be done, we analyze whether respondents' 
willingness to work (WTW), i.e. the working days they are willing to contribute for the 
implementation of the program measures, differs significantly between the specific work 
scenarios mentioned above, i.e. whether they have to contribute in terms of "hard" or "soft" 
work. 
Table 4: Differences in WTW between the different work scenarios (hard vs. soft) 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. 
How many working days 
would you be willing to 
contribute? 
soft work 249 3.99 4.609 0.292 
hard work 250 3.02 3.200 0.202 
 
As table 4 shows, the difference in the means of number of working days respondents are 
willing to contribute in addition to monetary payments is significant at the 1%-level between the 
"soft" and "hard" work scenario. WTW of respondents in the “hard” work scenario is 
significantly lower than that of respondents in the “soft” work scenario. This result is in 
accordance with our hypothesis H1.  
In a next step we test H2, i.e. whether the kind of work people do in their everyday life 
influences their willingness to work for landslide protection. First, we estimate different models 
to explain respondents’ decisions to contribute working time in addition to their monetary 
contributions. In all of these probit regression models the dependent variable is the decision 
to contribute working time (0 = no, 1 = yes) and the regressors are the respondent's age, 
education, income, ethnicity (1 = Kinh, 0 = other) and gender. These models vary only by a 
variable indicating the occupation of respondents taking into account the three most frequent 
occupations official, farmer and self-employment. Table 5 shows that, rather surprisingly, 
higher age and education level have a significantly positive influence on the likelihood to 
contribute working time, whereas female respondents, those belonging to the Kinh ethnic 
group and, most importantly, officials are significantly less likely to contribute working time. 
The model shown in table 6 has less significant variables, however, it shows that farmers are 
significantly more likely to contribute working time and respondents with other occupations. A 
model with self-employment as dummy variable did not show any significant effect of that 
type of occupation. These results support our hypothesis H2. 
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Table 5: Determinants of the decision to contribute working time: controlling for 
officials 
Variable Coefficient Significance (p-value)
AGE 0.012*** 0.0024 
EDU 0.273*** 0.0002 
INCOME 0.00000005 0.1666 
ETHNIC -1.358*** 0.0000 
GENDER (0 = female, 1 = male) 0.402* 0.0257 
OFFICIAL -.848*** 0.0036 
McFadden's R2 0.12  
Percent correctly predicted 87.5 %  
χ2-statistics 33 (df = 5) 0.0000 
***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 %, respectively 
 
Table 6:  Determinants of the decision to contribute working time: controlling for 
farmers 
Variable Coefficient Significance (p-value)
AGE -0.662 0.2031 
EDU 0.204*** 0.0021 
INCOME 0.00000006 0.1054 
ETHNIC -0.571** 0.0171 
GENDER (0 = female, 1 = male) 0.224 0.2676 
FARMER 1.560*** 0.0000 
McFadden's R2 0.29  
Percent correctly predicted 89.5 %  
χ2-statistics 81 (df = 5) 0.0000 
***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 %, respectively 
 
Only after respondents had decided whether to contribute working time in addition to monetary 
payments or not the specific kind of working setting, i. e. whether they had to contribute under 
the option "hard work" or "soft work" (see above) was explained to them. After the explanation 
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of the work setting respondents were asked how many working days at maximum they would 
be willing to contribute in addition to the monetary amount stated before. 
In table 7 we estimate a Tobit regression model regressing the stated number of working days 
a respondent is willing to contribute on some variables that we hypothesize to influence these 
statements3. 
Table 7: Explanatory model for WTW 
Variable Coefficient Significance (p-value)
CONSTANT -2.39 0.4125 
WORK (0 = soft, 1 = hard) -1.24*** 0.0035 
AFFECTED (0 = no, 1 = yes) 2.74 0.2450 
SHORTAGE 0.27 0.4592 
DAMAGE_FARM 0.59 0.1313 
DAMAGE_MERC -0.01 0.9733 
ECONLOSS -0.20 0.6560 
SEVERE -0.19 0.5342 
REPAIR_MONEY -0.77 0.6915 
REPAIR_WORK 0.22 0.2115 
ETHNIC -3.58*** 0.0000 
EDU 0.57*** 0.0051 
AGE 0.02 0.3470 
GENDER (0 = female, 1 = male) 0.74 0.1206 
INCOME 0.31* 0.0868 
OFFICIAL -2.13** 0.0161 
Log-likelihood -1043  
ANOVA based fit measure 0.059 - 
DECOMP based fit measure 0.098 - 
LM test for tobit 111.923 (df = 16) 0.0000 
***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 %, respectively 
                                                          
 
3  Since the dependent variable is left censored a Tobit model must be used for estimation, an OLS 
regression model would produce biased parameter estimates (Maddala, 1983). 
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In accordance with the results given in table 4, table 7 shows that, as expected, the dummy 
variable for the "hard work" setting has a significantly negative relationship with WTW. 
Further, Kinh people contribute significantly less working time than Black-Thai people. The 
sign of two more variables with a significant effect on WTW are not plausible: people with a 
relatively higher education and more income state significantly higher contributions in terms 
of working time, we had expected negative signs here. These astonishing results need 
further investigation. Using FARMER instead of OFFICIAL as a dummy variable for 
professional occupation in the model yields the same qualitative results as shown in table 7 
for the explanatory variables, however FARMER is estimated with a positive sign 
(p = 0.0308). This result illustrates that officials are willing to provide significantly less 
working time for this program than non-officials and farmers are willing to contribute 
significantly more time than non-farmers while controlling for ethnicity in both cases. The 
results of table 8 support our expectations stated in H1 and H2. 
Finally, we argued that it must be expected that respondents’ WTW depends on the 
opportunity cost of the time they spend on the communal work for landslide protection (H3). 
In our survey, respondents were asked what contributing working time would mean for them 
personally. As response categories, three options ordered according to descending 
opportunity cost were provided. Option 1 would entail losing money because no paid work 
could be done during that time, option 2 stands for getting into difficulties with respect to 
other tasks the respondent has to do, and option 3 entails almost no constraints at all since 
the respondent would just forgo free time. Specifically, we hypothesize that respondents 
under the "soft work" setting run much less into problems with their time allocation than 
respondents under the "hard work" setting since they expect that they would be able to 
choose the time and day of the contributed work for the program flexibly. To test H3 we 
analyze the correlation between the dummy variables for the three different response options 
and the work scenario (hard work vs. soft work).  
It can be seen from table 8 that, as expected, option 2 is significantly positively correlated 
with “hard work” whereas option 3 shows a significantly negative correlation with “hard work”. 
No significant correlation between option 1 and the work scenarios is found, only about 
7 - 8 % of respondents had chosen this option, anyway. We attribute this latter result to the 
fact that regardless of the kind of work respondents expected to contribute, they knew that 
they would be forced to catch up with their regular work (office work, farming etc.) anyway 
and, thus, would not lose money in the end. However, the correlations between the work 
scenarios and options 2 and 3 show that respondents already form specific expectations 
regarding their opportunity costs of contributing communal work for landslide protection. This 
result clearly supports our hypothesis H3. 
- 22 - 
Table 8: Differences in opportunity costs of contributed working time between work 
scenarios 
 Correlation coefficient 
(p-value) 
If you contributed your personal working time, would 
that mean that you… 
Work scenario 
(0 = soft work, 1 = hard work) 
… lose money because you cannot perform any paid 
work during that time?  (option 1) 
0.15 
(0.730) 
… get into difficulties with the work you have to do for 
your own business or farm because nobody else can do 
it for you? (option 2) 
0.153 
(0.001) 
… forgo only leisure time because you have enough 
spare time to do some extra work? (option 3) 
-0.188 
(0.000) 
 
Summing up, our three hypotheses (H1) to (H3) claiming the unsuitability of labour as a 
numeraire in CVM surveys could be confirmed through our empirical study. Using labour as a 
measuring rod for utility changes does not solve the problem that the monetary WTP of very 
poor households for public goods is severely restricted by their (un-)ability to pay. On the 
contrary, new and more severe problems of consistency are created by this approach.   
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we deal with the problem that in very poor countries household budgets are so 
tight that people cannot express their appreciation of a government project, e. g. in the 
environmental sector, adequately in terms of willingness to pay for that project. Therefore, 
the results of CVM analyses aiming at the monetary WTP of people for some environmental 
project might significantly underestimate their true appreciation of that project, i. e. the social 
benefits it creates. Since the decision for or against the realization of a public project 
depends on the comparison of its cost to the social benefits it creates, CVM might lead to 
wrong decisions in that it discriminates against projects in poor regions where WTP has to be 
low due to low incomes.  
It is demonstrated in this paper that households living on the poverty line will have to state a 
(close to) zero WTP in CVM interviews even if their true appreciation of the public project is 
much higher. As a consequence several authors suggest to use labour contributions instead 
of monetary contributions to the provision of a public project as a measuring rod for the utility 
a household expects from that project.  
We show that labour does not fulfil the fundamental requirements for a numeraire in CVM 
studies since labour is not as easily and straightforwardly convertible into utility as money. It 
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is shown empirically in the course of a CVM study in Vietnam that the WTP for one and the 
same public project in terms of labour depends decisively on the kind of labour ("hard work" 
or "soft work") that has to be done and the circumstances under which it has to be provided. 
Therefore, the "a dollar is a dollar is a dollar"-rule that is inherent in money-based CVM 
surveys typically does not hold for CVM surveys in terms of willingness to work (WTW). This 
makes the aggregation of WTW over households which is essential for the validity of the 
Hicks-Kaldor Criterion underlying the CVM decision rule highly problematic. In our CVM 
survey conducted in Vietnam our hypothesis that WTW is situation-dependent and not 
universal like money is proved empirically. As a consequence the use of labour contributions 
as a numeraire in CVM studies cannot be recommended. Instead, it has to be asked if the 
decision on public investments in very poor societies can reasonably be based on CVM 
surveys or WTP studies. At the moment it seems that the answer to this question is "no".  
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